Payment Diversion Fraud: Preventing It, and What to Do When Bank Details Change
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ARA Industries / Forensics · Facts checked 11 November 2026 (PHT).
An email arrives in a thread your finance team already knows well. It comes from a familiar contact, refers to a real invoice and asks, politely, that payment go to a new bank account this time. Nothing about it looks unusual. This is how payment diversion fraud usually works: it uses ordinary business conversations, not dramatic hacks.
This guide is written for finance, accounts payable and receivable, procurement and back-office teams in Philippine offshore and outsourced operations, and for the international companies that work with them. It covers prevention first, then a short checklist for the first hours if a payment has already gone, and then what a forensic investigation can establish. It is practical guidance from ARA Industries, not legal advice.
What is payment diversion fraud?
It is a type of business email compromise (BEC). The FBI describes BEC as a scam aimed at businesses and individuals who regularly make payments, carried out by compromising email accounts and other communication channels through social engineering or computer intrusion to make unauthorised transfers. [1] Europol describes the supplier version as invoice fraud: someone pretends to represent a supplier or creditor and asks for the bank details on future invoices to be changed to an account the fraudster controls. [2]
It shows up in the FBI's figures every year. In the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center's (IC3) 2025 report, BEC accounted for 24,768 complaints and US$3,046,598,558 in reported losses. [1] These are complaints made to IC3, not a count of every case worldwide.
How do these schemes typically work?
Most cases follow one of two patterns, sometimes both:
- A real mailbox is compromised. A password is phished or reused, and someone signs in to a genuine mailbox. They read the conversations, learn who pays whom and when, and then send or reply from that mailbox. Microsoft lists warning signs such as inbox rules that forward mail to unknown addresses or move messages into rarely checked folders, and recently added external forwarding. [3]
- A look-alike sender is used. The fraudster registers an address or domain that differs by a single character, or spoofs the display name, and joins or copies the thread. Europol notes that fraudsters often use copycat email addresses where only one character differs. [4]
In both patterns the request is timed around a real invoice, which is why it feels routine. Inbox rules can also hide the genuine replies, so neither side notices for a while.
Our analysis: offshore and outsourced finance teams often sit in the middle of these conversations, between an international client, its suppliers and its bank. That makes clear, shared verification rules between the two companies more useful than any single tool.
How can offshore teams and their clients prevent it?
Prevention is mostly good process, agreed in advance by both companies:
- Call back on a known number. Confirm every request to change bank details through a contact you already hold, never one taken from the email or letter asking for the change. Europol and the FBI both recommend verifying changes through a separate channel. [2][8]
- Name the people who can change payee details. Europol suggests designated single points of contact with the companies you pay regularly. [2]
- Use two-person approval for new payees and bank-detail changes, and do not skip steps when a request is marked urgent or confidential. [4]
- Use phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication on finance and executive mailboxes. Our guide to MFA that actually stops phishing explains the options.
- Block or alert on automatic external forwarding, and review inbox rules on finance mailboxes regularly. [3]
- Control app consent, so staff cannot grant third-party apps access to a mailbox without review. Microsoft publishes guidance on investigating illicit app consent grants. [5]
- Check your audit log settings now. In Microsoft 365, Audit (Standard) records are kept for 180 days by default; Google Workspace keeps Gmail log events for 6 months. [6][7] Knowing this before an incident tells you how long you have to export them.
- Agree the incident route in the contract: who tells whom, how quickly, and through which channel if email cannot be trusted.
For broader controls in outsourced teams, see our guide to BPO security in hybrid and work-from-home teams.
What should you do in the first hours?
If a payment may have gone to the wrong account, work calmly through this list. Speed matters for the bank recall, and order matters for the evidence.
- Call your bank and ask for a recall. The FBI's advice is that time is of the essence: contact your financial institution immediately, request a recall and ask what indemnification documents it needs. [1][8] In the Philippines, the Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act (Republic Act No. 12010) allows institutions to temporarily hold funds in a disputed transaction for a period set by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, up to 30 days unless extended by a court. [9]
- Report it. File a complaint with IC3 if a US party or bank is involved, including the full transaction details, and report to local police or the cybercrime authorities where you are. [1][4]
- Tell the other company through a channel you trust, such as a phone number from your records, not the email thread.
- Preserve the mailboxes. Don't delete the suspicious messages, rules or the thread. Place the affected mailboxes on hold if your platform allows it.
- Record the rules and forwarding before removing them. Export or screenshot each inbox rule and forwarding setting, then disable it.
- Save the full message headers of the fraudulent emails and the genuine ones around them.
- Export the audit logs now. Export Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace sign-in, mailbox and admin audit records for the relevant period before retention runs out. [6][7]
- Check connected apps. List any OAuth apps that have been granted access to the affected mailboxes, and record them before revoking. [5]
- Secure the account. Reset passwords, revoke active sessions and re-check MFA on the affected account. [3]
- Write a short timeline: who noticed what, when, and every action taken since, with times and the time zone.
What does a forensic investigation establish?
Once money has moved, both companies, their banks and often their insurers will ask the same questions. A forensic review of the mail headers, sign-in records, audit logs and mailbox contents is how they get evidence-based answers:
| Question | What the evidence can show |
|---|---|
| Whose mailbox was compromised? | Whether the fraudulent emails came from a genuine mailbox on either side or from a look-alike sender, based on headers and sending records |
| When did access begin? | First suspicious sign-ins, their locations and devices, and when rules, forwarding or app consents were added |
| How did they get in? | Signs of phishing, password reuse, a granted OAuth app or another route, as far as the logs record it |
| What else was read? | Which messages and folders were accessed. In Microsoft 365, MailItemsAccessed records can show mail access in detail. [10] |
| Is access closed? | Whether rules, forwarding, sessions and app grants have been removed and nothing remains |
A good report also states its limits: which accounts and logs were examined, for which dates, and what was not available.
Why does the answer matter between the two companies?
When an invoice is paid to the wrong account, both companies have lost something, and the question of which environment was compromised affects how the loss is handled. It can shape conversations with banks, insurers and legal advisers, and whether personal data was exposed and needs to be considered under data privacy rules.
Our analysis: the most productive approach is for both companies to preserve their own records quickly and share findings through an agreed channel. Evidence answers the question more fairly, and more quickly, than either side's assumptions. Coverage and liability decisions stay with the companies, their insurers and their legal advisers.
How does ARA Industries help?
ARA Industries can arrange digital forensics and incident response for organisations in the Philippines and the international companies that work with them. With your written authorisation, we can help you preserve and examine the mailboxes, headers, audit logs and sign-in records involved, and report what the evidence shows and where its limits are, in a form your management, your counterparty, your insurer and your legal counsel can use. We can also help you set up the prevention steps above.
ARA Industries is a registered WithSecure partner. To talk it through, contact ARA Industries. Please don't send evidence files, passwords or personal data in your first message; we will arrange a secure way to collect what is needed.
General guidance, not legal advice. Bank recall options, reporting duties and liability depend on your banks, your contracts and the laws that apply to you.
Which sources support this guide?
All links checked 11 November 2026 (PHT).
- FBI IC3: 2025 Internet Crime Report: BEC definition, 2025 complaint and loss figures, and Recovery Asset Team guidance.
- Europol: Invoice fraud (prevention guide, PDF).
- Microsoft Learn: Responding to a compromised email account.
- Europol: Take control of your digital life, CEO/BEC fraud.
- Microsoft Learn: App consent grant investigation.
- Microsoft Learn: Manage audit log retention policies.
- Google Workspace Admin Help: Data retention and lag times.
- FBI IC3: Business Email Compromise, The $55 Billion Scam (PSA, 11 September 2024).
- Republic Act No. 12010, Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act, Section 7; see also the BSP AFASA booklet with IRR.
- Microsoft Learn: Use MailItemsAccessed to investigate compromised accounts.
Frequently asked questions
What is payment diversion fraud?
It is a form of business email compromise. A criminal uses a compromised or look-alike email account to send a convincing request to pay a genuine invoice into a different bank account. Europol calls the supplier version invoice fraud; the FBI groups it under business email compromise.
What is the single most useful prevention step?
Confirm every request to change bank details through a contact you already hold, such as a phone number from your supplier records, never one taken from the email asking for the change. Europol and the FBI both give this advice.
Should we delete the suspicious inbox rule as soon as we find it?
Stop it working first, but keep a record. Export or screenshot the rule, its conditions and its creation details, and preserve the mailbox and audit logs before you remove anything. The rule is often key evidence of how and when the mailbox was used.
Which company's mailbox was compromised, ours or theirs?
That is exactly what a forensic review of both sides' mail headers, sign-in records and audit logs is designed to answer. The answer depends on evidence from the accounts involved, so both companies preserving their records early makes it far easier to reach.